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Technique T1077

Windows Admin Shares

Self-propagating threats—notably those that leverage ETERNALBLUE—contribute to the prevalence of Windows Admin Shares abuse.

Editors’ note: While the analysis and detection opportunities remain applicable, this technique page was written for a previous Threat Detection Report and has not been updated in 2022.


Why do adversaries use Windows Admin Shares?

Windows Admin Shares are enabled by default on most Windows systems, and administrators regularly use them to conduct remote host management. Since Windows Admin Share activity is so common, it provides adversaries with a powerful, discreet way to move laterally within an environment. Self-propagating ransomware and cryptocurrency miners, both rapidly emerging threats, rely on Windows Admin Shares.

Many popular lateral movement and execution tools leverage Windows Admin Shares, including:

  • PsExec
  • RemCom
  • CSExec
  • PAExec
  • Impacket wmiexec

How do adversaries use Windows Admin Shares?

Adversaries commonly use administrative tools such as PsExec (and the various clones of it) to deploy malware from one machine to another. Admin shares can also be used to store the output of commands for easy access.

The rise of ETERNALBLUE—a prominent, publicly available exploit for a vulnerability in the Windows server message block (SMB) protocol—is a major factor in increased detection of Windows Admin Shares and related activity. To that point, many of our ETERNALBLUE-related analytics map partially to Windows Admin Shares and alert on threats such as:

  • WannaCry
  • TrickBot
  • Several cryptocurrency miners
  • Metasploit
  • Cobalt Strike
  • Other post-exploitation frameworks that use Impacket wmiexec
  • Red teams

Sighted with

Windows Admin Shares are often used in conjunction with behaviors relating to Remote File Copy (T1105)—because adversaries commonly use the technique to remotely copy files—and Network Share Discovery (T1135). It can also occur with New Service (T1050) and Service Execution (T1035) because PsExec deploys its receiver executable to admin shares, scheduling a service to execute it.



MITRE’s data sources

  • Process use of network
  • Authentication logs
  • Process monitoring
  • Process command-line parameters

Collection requirements

Process use of network

The malicious use of Windows Admin Shares is often accompanied by large numbers of internal network connections to hosts over the SMB protocol on port 445. Monitoring for this type of activity—high volumes of network connections over port 445—has been instrumental in helping us identify adversarial uses of Windows Admin Shares.

Authentication logs, process monitoring, process command-line parameters

Authentication logs are a useful data source for observing certain aspects of malicious Windows Admin Shares. So too is process monitoring, which is often used in conjunction with Scheduled Tasks, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). Process command-line parameters are useful as well, particularly for localhost shares.

Network shares

While MITRE doesn’t list it explicitly, security teams should also consider monitoring network shares (e.g., ADMIN$, C$, and PRINT$), because malicious use of Windows Admin Shares frequently coincides with execution from network shares. An example of this might include the redirection of host or other data in the service of conducting reconnaissance on the localhost admin share.

Detection suggestions

Some telemetry patterns to help detect this type of behavior include the use of cmd.exe with the names of shares such as localhost\ADMIN$ or\ADMIN$.

Weeding out false positives

Because admin shares are often used within the enterprise, but are rarely used uniformly across enterprises, generic detection strategies frequently lead to high false positive rates.

If admin shares are being legitimately used, process and process command-line monitoring may allow you to build a list of processes and attributes that are known, so that you can alert on any deviations. For example, if you expect process ntoskrnl.exe to make a local admin share modification to a specific file at path\admin$\[name-of-file], then these can be suppressed and any other process may generate an alert.

Other common sources of false positives are inventory and asset discovery systems. Extend the whitelisting strategy above, adding criteria for initiating system(s), frequency, time of day, and other limiting factors. Just be sure to closely monitor the integrity of any system that you add to your list of trusted initiators, as these systems may be useful targets to an adversary.


Getting Started With Atomic Red Team

Start testing your defenses against Windows Admin Shares using Atomic Red Team—an open source testing framework of small, highly portable detection tests mapped to MITRE ATT&CK.

Getting started

View Atomic tests for T1077: Windows Admin Shares. In most environments, these should be sufficient to generate a useful signal for defenders.

Run this test on a Windows system using Command Prompt:
cmd.exe /Q /c hostname 1> \\\ADMIN$\output.txt 2>&1
Useful telemetry will include:
Data SourceTelemetry
Data Source:

Process monitoring



Data Source:

Process use of network


connection to, access to admin shares

Review and repeat

Now that you have executed one or several common tests and checked for the expected results, it’s useful to answer some immediate questions:

  • Were any of your actions detected?
  • Were any of your actions blocked or prevented
  • Were your actions visible in logs or other defensive telemetry?

Repeat this process, performing additional tests related to this technique. You can also create and contribute tests of your own.

Keya Horiuchi
Detection engineer
The detection strategies in this section were brought to you by Keya Horiuchi! Before joining Red Canary as a detection engineer, Keya gained experience in multiple areas of information security, including security audits, web and network infrastructure assessments, and network system administration.
The detection strategies in this section were brought to you by Keya Horiuchi! Before joining Red Canary as a detection engineer, Keya gained experience in multiple areas of information security, including security audits, web and network infrastructure assessments, and network system administration.
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